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How Does Government Control Affect Firm Value? New
Evidence for China
Marzieh Abolhassani, Zhi Wang and Jakob de Haan*
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of government involvement in firms has received a lot of attention both
from policymakers and academics in the last few decades. Government involve-
ment could result in a ‘supporting hand’ and a ‘grabbing hand’ (Shleifer 1998).
To be more specific, government interventions could address problems such as
natural monopolies, externalities and information asymmetries, thus tackling
market failure (‘supporting hand’). However, politicians could also pursue their
own political or private goals at the cost of sacrificing public interests and
distorting market allocation (‘grabbing hand’) (Shleifer and Vishny 1994).
So far, the impact of government involvement on the financial performance of
listed firms in emerging economies has received scant attention. This paper ex-
amines the relationship between government control of firms and firms’ financial
performance for the case of China. The Chinese central government has reduced
its control over firms both by (partially) privatizing state-owned corporations and
by transferring ownership rights. But these measures do not necessarily imply
less control by the central government. Furthermore, the influence of other types
of government on firms may have increased. We therefore examine how govern-
ment control of firms, measured by the direct and indirect shareholdings con-
trolled by the government (be it central or local), influences the financial
performance of firms publicly traded on the stock exchanges of Shanghai and
Shenzhen.1
1There is a related line of research examining how political connections of private business owners enhance
firm performance. A recent example is the work by Kung and Ma (2018), who also provide an extensive dis-
cussion of this line of research. These authors find that Chinese private firms were able to experience growth
in a weak property rights environment, because their owners respond to official discrimination in access to
scarce inputs and the ‘grabbing government hand’ by fostering political connections with government offi-
cials. Our work is also related to research about the relationship between the institutional regime in place
and economic growth; see Tang and Tang (2018) for a recent contribution and de Haan (2019) for an exten-
sive discussion of this literature.
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An important contribution of this paper is that we measure government con-
trol by the fraction of outstanding shares held either directly or indirectly by the
government. In our view, this is the most appropriate measure for two reasons.
First, as firms are listed the government is, by definition, not the only share-
holder. Second, direct ownership of firms is not always decisive in determining
the degree of control of a shareholder (Liu et al. 2003; Xia and Fang 2005).
There are various types of ownership that affect the concentration of control,
such as differential voting rights, cross-shareholding and pyramid structures
(La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2000). Previous studies generally mea-
sured concentration of control by identifying the largest direct shareholders
(Xu and Wang 1999; Sun et al. 2002; Tian and Estrin 2008). In contrast, this
study includes the effect of pyramid structures and examines how direct and in-
direct government control affects firm performance.2 To illustrate, consider two
companies, A and B. Suppose that the government is the largest shareholder of
A, while firm A owns the majority of shares of company B. When using direct
ownership, company B would be defined as non-government controlled. How-
ever, the government has indirect control on company B via its voting rights in
A, and it would therefore be inaccurate to recognize company B as a non-
state-controlled company. To avoid the bias caused by using direct ownership,
this study adopts the ownership theory proposed by Liu et al. (2003) to deter-
mine whether a Chinese listed company is state controlled or non-state con-
trolled. We classify firms as state controlled whenever the government is the
shareholder with the largest number of shares held either directly or indirectly
through pyramid structures.
Our empirical results suggest that firm performance is generally lower for
firms where the government is the shareholder with the largest number of (direct
and indirect) shares. Specifically, the return on assets, the return on equity and
the market-to-book ratio are, on average, 1.3%, 2.0% and 8.2% lower for
government-controlled firms. Both central and local government control is
undermining firm performance. These findings provide support for the ‘grabbing
hand’ theory of the government. In establishing this result, we make sure the es-
timates are not driven by differences in the size, age and leverage of the firms.
Importantly, we also control for industry-region-year fixed effects, and therefore
compare firms within the same industry in the same province during the same
year, further enhancing the credibility of our estimates. In addition to studying
the extensive margin of government control, we also examine its intensive mar-
gin, i.e. whether a firm with more shares held (directly or indirectly) by the gov-
ernment performs differently from a firm with fewer shares held by the
government. We find that the return on assets and the return on equity are
2In China, the company law stipulates that each share should hold equal rights and that investors should pay
the same price for shares that are offered at the same time.
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negatively related to the control rights of the government. In contrast, the market-
to-book ratio is positively related to the number of government-owned shares.
Apart from measuring government control by including indirect ownership,
this paper contributes to research into government involvement in firms in three
additional ways. Firstly, most previous studies investigating government influ-
ence on company performance use dummies capturing government control (see
Megginson and Netter 2001). This paper adds to this literature in that it measures
government influence more accurately with both dummies and concentration of
control rights. Secondly, this paper contributes to databases on government con-
trol, by manually collecting more effective information about government
shareholdings from annual reports of Chinese listed companies and building a
new database of government control from 2009 to 2013 with 5501 observations.
Finally, our study extends the literature on the relationship between government
control and corporate performance by investigating the influence of government
control on firm performance for firms with different levels of profitability. Our
results suggest that the negative effect of government control is stronger for prof-
itable firms than for non-profitable firms. Firms with a poor financial perfor-
mance benefit from government control, which supports the ‘supporting hand’
theory of the government (Shleifer 1998).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II presents a re-
view of related literature and formulates hypotheses on the relationship between
government control and corporate performance. This is followed by an explana-
tion of the data collection process, definition of variables and descriptive statis-
tics in Section III. Section IV presents and explains the main results, and
shows the robustness of the estimates. The final section draws conclusions, dis-
cusses the limitations of our study and indicates directions for further research.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
There is an extensive literature on firm performance under government and pri-
vate ownership. Typically, government-owned firms are found to be less efficient
and less profitable than privately owned firms. This difference is often attributed
to principal-agent deficiencies, such as less monitoring of management and the
lack of incentives to maximize profits (Vining and Boardman 1992; La Porta
et al. 1999). The nature of the relationship between government ownership (or
control) and firm performance is essentially an empirical question. However,
the empirical results based on the case of China are rather mixed. Several authors
argue that government ownership in China is negatively related with firm perfor-
mance because of goal incongruence between the government and firms (Xu and
Wang 1999; Qi et al. 2000; Sun and Tong 2003; Xia and Fang 2005; Wei 2007;
Huang and Wang 2011). At the same time, some authors report that government
ownership boosts the development of firms (Che and Qian 1998). Others find a
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non-linear relationship. For instance, Yu (2013) reports that state ownership has
a U-shaped relationship with firm performance. Sun et al. (2002) and Wei (2007)
find a concave relationship between state ownership and firm performance. Fi-
nally, some authors (like Wang 2005 and Sun and Tong 2003) find no significant
association between government ownership and firm performance.
Compared to non-government-controlled firms, firms under government con-
trol face the issue that politicians have both the motives and the power to impose
their social and political goals on affiliated companies. This may result in poorer
performance (Xu and Wang 1999; Hanwen et al. 2011; Yu 2013). Politicians are
motivated to accomplish their own political goals such as enhancing their polit-
ical capital and promotion potential, through their involvement in government-
controlled firms (Lin et al. 1998; Hanwen et al. 2011).
In addition, the economy of China is in a transitional phase. The institutional
system, including government administration, legislation and the judiciary sys-
tem, are immature and incomplete. As a result, the protection of investors is quite
weak, which makes it easier for politicians to pursue their own interests. This
leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: In China, government-controlled firms have a worse financial
performance than non-government-controlled firms.
The Chinese economy has gone through a restructuring of power distribution
from the central government to the local government, which promotes local gov-
ernments to compete for resources in order to achieve their own social goals such
as regional economic development, healthy public finances and social stability
(Lin et al. 1998; Hanwen et al. 2011). Qian (1996) argues that local governments
generally have a strong incentive to impose policies on their listed firms, espe-
cially during periods with fiscal difficulties (Wang and Xiao 2009). According
to the ‘grabbing hand’ theory, government-controlled enterprises deviate from
economic efficiency, when the government uses firms under its control to serve
political objectives (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). The study of Cheung et al.
(2010) reports support for the ‘grabbing hand’ theory only for listed firms owned
by local governments; for firms owned by the central government, their findings
are more consistent with the ‘helping hand’ model. Based on these arguments we
expect differences between firms under ultimate control by the central and the lo-
cal government:
Hypothesis 2: In China, local government-controlled firms have a worse finan-
cial performance than firms controlled by the central government.
As the criteria for political promotion of officials in China include both polit-
ical and economic achievements (Li and Zhou 2005), politicians have incentives
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to ensure that firms under their control perform well. A solid and steady perfor-
mance of affiliated firms is one of the most principal and self-evident indicators
of successful governance. Bankruptcy or the delisting of firms could both dam-
age the reputation of government officials, but also worsen the performance of
the (local) economy, which could further jeopardize the possibility of personal
promotion for government officials. Therefore, politicians will always try to find
the proper balance between grabbing from and delivering benefits to firms under
their control. The better firms are performing, the more politicians have the pos-
sibility to exploit them for their own benefit and to achieve social and political
goals. So, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3: In China, the grabbing influence of government control on
firms increases as corporate performance increases.
III. RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA
III.1. Data
The data used in this study is obtained from the main Board A-share3 PLCs (Pub-
lic Listed Companies) of both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges over
the period 2009 to 2013. Consistent with Xia and Fang (2005), we select our
sample by: (1) Dropping the firms containing B shares or H shares4; (2)
Dropping the firms whose controllers’ identity and control rights are ambiguous
and/or information was missing. After these procedures, our remaining unbal-
anced panel dataset includes 5501 firm-year observations (see Table 1 for
details).
We determine the nature of firm ownership, concentration of control and con-
trol rights from the firms’ annual reports. These data have been manually col-
lected from the annual reports of the PLCs listed. We determine the
concentration of control based on the control relationships. Although it is re-
quired by the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) that every listed
company should disclose specific information about the concentration of control5
in the annual reports, there are some inaccuracies or even mistakes in revealing
this important information. We deleted those firms if we found mistakes about
3Shares (in Renminbi) that are traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. This is in contrast to
Renminbi B shares which are owned by foreigners who cannot purchase A-shares due to Chinese govern-
ment restrictions.
4H shares refer to shares of companies incorporated in mainland China that are traded on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange.
5This means disclosure of the identity of the shareholder with the highest number of shares, and also the
shareholding percentage of every controller in the pyramid structure.
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such data in the annual reports, or if no reliable information was provided by
which we could identify the shareholder with the highest concentration of con-
trol. We manually collected direct and indirect shareholdings to identify the con-
centration of control. We define concentration of control rights (CC), as the
percentage of the shares controlled by the shareholder with the highest share of
direct and indirect shares (voting rights). This shareholder can be a private person
or firm or the government.6 The variable Goverment is a dummy variable equal
to one if the concentration of control lies with the government and zero otherwise
(Xia and Fang 2005; Wang et al. 2008). Similarly, the dummy variables Central
and Local indicate whether a firm’s biggest shareholder is the central government
or a local government, respectively.
The firm-level financial information and characteristics are downloaded from
the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. We use
three widely used proxies for firm performance: return on assets (ROA), return
on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q (TQ).7 We calculate ROA (ROE) as the ratio
of net income to average total assets (equity) of firm i at time t and Tobin’s Q
as the stock market value of the firm divided by total assets.
III.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the 5501 firm-year observations in our
sample. Panel A shows the yearly distribution of the identity of the shareholder
with the highest number of (direct or indirect) shares, divided into central govern-
ment, local government and private parties. In most firms (66%) the
6Appendix A provides more details and offers an example to illustrate our procedure.
7Earlier studies, such as Xu and Wang (1999); Qi et al. (2000); Sun et al. (2002); Gunasekarage et al. (2007);




Criterion: Number of firms in different years:
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Main Board A-share PLCs 1336 1365 1395 1414 1418 6928
of which: Shanghai Stock Exchange 863 892 923 944 950 4572
of which: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 473 473 472 470 468 2356
Less: Firms containing B-share or H-share 154 160 163 166 166 809
Less: Firms whose controllers’ identity
and control rights are ambiguous
108 100 87 101 103 499
Less: Firms with missing values 29 25 24 22 19 119
Total 1045 1080 1121 1125 1130 5501
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concentration of control lies with the government, and the distribution across
government and private control remains relatively stable over the five sample
years. The central government controls 21% of all firms in our sample while local
governments have control over more companies (45%). Panel B presents the dis-
tribution of the identity of the biggest shareholder among all sectors. Although
the government controls many firms in all sectors, in key sectors, such as industry
and public utilities, government control is higher (66% and 79 %, respectively).
Table 2
Concentration of control
Panel A. Yearly distribution of the largest shareholder
Central government Local government Non-government Total
N % N % N % N %
2009 223 21 491 47 331 32 1045 19
2010 233 22 496 46 351 32 1080 20
2011 236 21 490 44 395 35 1121 20
2012 234 21 489 43 402 36 1125 20
2013 229 20 488 43 413 37 1130 21
Total 1155 21 2454 45 1892 34 5501 100
Panel B. The distribution of the largest shareholders across industries
Central government Local government Non-government Total
N % N % N % N %
Industry 849 24 1462 42 1182 34 3493 63.5
Finance 2 7 10 37 15 56 27 0.5
Real estate 91 14 282 44 264 42 637 11.6
Commercial 54 10 258 50 209 40 521 9.5
Comprehensive 20 9 97 46 94 45 211 3.8
Public Utility 139 23 345 56 128 21 612 11.1
Total 1155 0.21 2454 0.45 1882 0.34 5501 100
Table 3
Summary Statistics
Variables Definition Mean SD 25% 75%
ROA Net income to average assets 0.037 0.072 .010 .062
ROE Net income to average equity 0.067 0.206 .024 .137
Tobin’s Q (TQ) Market value of equity to total assets 2.260 1.841 2.547 12.787
CC Concentration of control 0.386 0.167 .25 .51
Government =1 if the government is the largest
shareholder
0.656 0.475 0 1
Central =1 if the central government is the largest
shareholder
0.210 0.41 0 1
Local =1 if the local government is the largest
shareholder
0.448 0.497 0 1
Size Log of total assets 21.991 1.425 21.13 22.83
Age Number of years since IPO 12.75 4.42 10 16
Leverage Liabilities to assets 0.537 0.211 .386 .689
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Table 3 presents summary statistics of the main variables used in the regres-
sion analysis. The corporations in our samples have an average Tobin’s Q of
2.26. This average is very similar to that reported by Gunasekarage et al. (2007)
(i.e. 2.48) for the period 2000 to 2004 and Wei et al. (2005) (i.e. 2.92) for the pe-
riod 1991 to 2001.8 Profits are around 3.7% (6.2%) of assets (equity). On aver-
age, Chinese enterprises have assets of 22 billion CNY, which are mostly
funded by debt (54%) but also by equity to a great extent.
III.3. Modeling financial performance
We investigate the relationship between government control and financial per-
formance using regression models. We include several control variables into
the regression. Many scholars argue that a firm’s size affects its performance
(e.g. Tan and Peng, 2003; Mishina et al. 2004). Larger firms might exploit
economies of scale and may have better access to bank credit and other re-
sources, which could improve corporate profitability. On the other hand, larger
companies can be involved in more government bureaucracy and bigger agency
problems which may negatively affect firm performance. Therefore, we add the
natural logarithm of total assets to control for firm size (Sizei,t). Older firms
might have better experience in capital management. Moreover, older firms
might have better networks and links to better sources. Therefore, we include
the control variables Agei,t, measured as the duration since initial public offer-
ing, and its square Age2i;t. Jensen (1986) suggests that firms with higher leverage
pay more interest and are likely to obtain additional debt financing, which
affects its investment. In order to control for any possible leverage effect, we
include the leverage ratio, which is calculated as total liabilities divided by total
assets (Leveragei,t). We expect a negative effect of leverage on firm
performance.
In addition to helping explain firm performance, the inclusion of these control
variables also makes sure that we measure the effect of government ownership
separately from possible correlations between government ownership and, for in-
stance, firm size and leverage. To ensure that we measure a pure effect of govern-
ment ownership, we also include a full set of industry-region-time (τk,j,t) fixed
effects. These fixed effects absorb any variation in financial performance be-
tween industries and regions and over time. In effect, we are therefore comparing
government-owned enterprises to private firms in the same industry in the same
province during the same year. To test whether government control influences
8The average of Tobin’s Q of firms in this sample is however substantially higher than the Tobin’s Q ratio
reported by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) (i.e. 1.13) for a sample of US companies during 1976 to 1980.
The difference between Tobin’s Q for the Chinese and US sample suggests that a much higher growth rate
is priced into the valuation of Chinese companies compared to their more mature US counterparts.
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the performance of companies we first estimate the following model:
Performancei;t ¼ β0 þ β1Governmenti;t þ β2Agei;t þ β3Age2i;t þ β4Sizei;t
þ β5Leveragei;t þ τk;j;t þ εi;t (1)
The coefficient of interest is β1, which measures the average difference in perfor-
mance of government-controlled firms compared to other firms of similar size,
age and leverage and being active in the same industry and residing in the same
province for a given year. Hypothesis boils down to testing whether β1 is signif-
icantly negative.
The above regression measures the extensive margin of government control.
To be able to test whether firms with a larger government share are performing
differently from firms with fewer shares controlled by the government (but which
still have the government as largest shareholder), we extend the model by adding
the interaction between the concentration of control rights (CC), i.e. the direct
and indirect shares controlled by the largest shareholder, and the government
control dummy:
Performancei;t ¼ β0 þ β1Governmenti;t þ β2Governmenti;tCCi;t
þ β3CCi;t þ β4Agei;t þ β5Age2i;t þ β6Sizei;t þ β7Leveragei;t
þ τk;j;t þ εi;t (2)
The coefficients of interest are β1 and β2. The latter measures the differential ef-
fect of more government control rights within the subset of government-
controlled firms. To test hypothesis , we expand equation 2 by differentiating be-
tween central and local governments as the largest shareholder:
Performancei;t ¼ β0 þ β1Centrali;t þ β2Locali;t þ β3Centrali;tCCi;t
þ β4Locali;tCCi;t þ β5CCi;t þ β6Agei;t þ β7Age2i;t
þ β8Sizei;t þ β9Leveragei;t þ τk;j;t þ εi;t (3)
The coefficients of interest are β1, β2, β3 and β4. β3 measures the differential im-
pact of more voting rights of the central government, and β4 measures the same
for the local government. Hypothesis is tested by examining whether there is a
significant difference between the performance of listed firms under control of
a local and the central government, respectively.
We estimate all equations using OLS. Further, we test our model using
quantile regressions, where quantiles are defined based on firm performance.
An advantage of this approach is that it is easy to compare the values of the co-
efficients and standard errors with OLS estimates. Additionally, quantile regres-
sions are an appropriate method to test the effect of a small increase in the
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location of the distribution of the explanatory variable X on the ιth quantile of the
unconditional distribution of Y (Firpo et al. 2009). With quantile regressions we
examine how government control influences firms with different corporate per-
formance (i.e. different effect of government control on financially healthy and
distressed firms). According to hypothesis , the negative coefficient should be in-
creasing in the percentiles of the distribution of performance.
IV. RESULTS
IV.1. Main findings
Table 4 reports the regression results corresponding to hypothesis . Columns
(1), (3) and (5) show regression outcomes for model 1 for ROA, ROE and
Tobin’s Q, respectively. For each of these performance metrics, our results
suggest that government-controlled firms perform worse than non-govern-
ment-controlled firms. Compared to firms of similar age, size and leverage,
government-controlled firms earn 1.3% (2.0%) lower profits relative to assets
(equity), and have 8.2% lower market valuation. These results provide support
for hypothesis and to theories conjecturing that management of firms
Table 4
Financial performance and government control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROE ROE ln (TQ) ln (TQ)
Government -0.013*** 0.002 -0.020** 0.047** -0.082*** -0.206***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.026) (0.053)
Government × CC -0.050** -0.208*** 0.342***
(0.021) (0.047) (0.121)
CC 0.081*** 0.249*** -0.252**
(0.017) (0.038) (0.099)
Age -0.054*** -0.039*** -0.122*** -0.078*** 0.354*** 0.331***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.026) (0.086) (0.086)
Age2 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.054*** 0.040*** -0.122*** -0.118***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.038) (0.038)
Size 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.034*** 0.030*** -0.206*** -0.203***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012)
Leverage -0.126*** -0.125*** -0.215*** -0.213*** -0.131* -0.117*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.024) (0.025) (0.068) (0.068)
Constant -0.113*** -0.108*** -0.496*** -0.513*** 5.052*** 5.098***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.077) (0.078) (0.259) (0.260)
Observations 5,501 5,501 5,501 5,501 5,501 5,501
R2 0.266 0.276 0.207 0.218 0.488 0.495
Notes: Columns (1), (3) and (5) in this table show OLS regression results for equation 1. Columns (2),
(4) and (6) of this table show OLS regression results for equation 2. In the table, Age is rescaled and is
measured in decades. All specifications include industry-province-year dummies. Clustered (by firm)
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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controlled by the government have fewer incentives to maximize profits and
shareholder value.
Columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 4 present the estimation results for equa-
tion 2, which includes the interaction between the concentration of control rights
(CC), i.e. the direct and indirect shares controlled by the largest shareholder, and
the government control dummy. CC is positively and significantly associated
with ROA and ROE, indicating that a more concentrated control structure is ben-
eficial to boosting corporate performance. This result is consistent with that of
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Megginson et al. (1994), Xu and Wang (1999),
Lemmon and Lins (2003), Chen et al. (2004), and Kang and Kim (2012). How-
ever, the interaction between the government dummy and CC is significantly and
negatively related to ROA and ROE, indicating the worsening effects of govern-
ment control. For example, if government control increases by one standard de-
viation, the return on assets will drop by 0.83 percent, which is roughly 23
percent of the average firm’s ROA. In contrast to ROA and ROE, the effect of
more shares controlled by the government is positive for Tobin’s Q. Based on
this estimate, we find that firms with more than 60% of shares controlled by
the government perform better than average, whereas firms with fewer shares
controlled by the government have below-average market valuation. A firm with
25% of shares controlled by the government is predicted to be valued at 2.14.
We extend the model by differentiating between central and local government
shareholdings in Table 5. In columns (1), (3) and (5), in which we do not con-
sider the concentration of control, the coefficients on the central and local gov-
ernment control dummies are statistically significant at the 5 % confidence
level. The coefficient on the interaction of CC and the central government control
dummy is negatively associated with ROA while the coefficient on Local×CC is
insignificant (column 2). The Wald test indicates that the coefficients on
Central×CC and Local×CC are significantly different albeit only at the 10 %
confidence level.9 The coefficients on CC and the central and local government
control dummies in the regressions for ROE and Tobin’s Q are not significantly
different from each other. To sum up, while control by the central and local gov-
ernments have mostly a negative effect on firm performance, we only find mixed
evidence in support of hypothesis .
IV.2. Quantile regression estimates
Next, we turn to hypothesis (3). To test this hypothesis, we use quantile regres-
sions, which measure the impact of government control across firms’
9We perform the Wald test for H0: β1 = β2 (coefficients on Central and Local) and H0: β3 = β4 (coefficients on
Central × CC and Local × CC) to test whether their differences are statistically significant.
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performance distribution. Table 6 reports the results of quantile regressions of
equation 2. We perform regressions for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percen-
tiles for each measure of firm performance. The first two panels of Table 6 show
that the effect of more shares being controlled by the government on firm perfor-
mance becomes more negative when performance increases. In other words, the
negative interventional effect of government control becomes stronger as the
profitability of firms increases. This finding supports the ‘supporting hand’ and
‘grabbing hand’ theory of government. The government supports non-profitable
firms to prevent them from being delisted or going bankrupt. However, if firms
become profitable, the government exploits them to achieve its social and polit-
ical goals. For the market valuation regression in the third panel of Table 6, we
find that the positive impact of government control increases for higher-valued
firms.
Table 7 repeats the same quantile regression models but using model 3 in-
stead, differentiating between firms controlled by local governments and those
controlled by the central government. In the first two panels, we find stronger
negative effects if the central government has more control rights than when
Table 5
Financial performance and central vs. local government control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROE ROE ln (TQ) ln (TQ)
Central -0.017*** 0.011 -0.034*** 0.048* -0.057* -0.176**
(0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.027) (0.032) (0.074)
Local -0.011*** -0.002 -0.014* 0.046** -0.094*** -0.219***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.020) (0.027) (0.057)
Central × CC -0.078*** -0.240*** 0.313**
(0.026) (0.063) (0.156)
Local × CC -0.036 -0.190*** 0.353***
(0.023) (0.050) (0.135)
CC 0.080*** 0.247*** -0.250**
(0.017) (0.038) (0.099)
Age -0.054*** -0.040*** -0.121*** -0.079*** 0.352*** 0.329***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.026) (0.086) (0.085)
Age2 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.053*** 0.040*** -0.120*** -0.116***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.038) (0.038)
Size 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.034*** 0.030*** -0.206*** -0.203***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012)
Leverage -0.126*** -0.124*** -0.215*** -0.211*** -0.132* -0.117*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.024) (0.025) (0.068) (0.068)
Constant -0.114*** -0.110*** -0.499*** -0.517*** 5.056*** 5.101***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.076) (0.078) (0.259) (0.260)
Observations 5,501 5,501 5,501 5,501 5,501 5,501
R2 0.266 0.278 0.208 0.219 0.488 0.495
Notes: Columns (1), (3) and (5) in this table show OLS regression results for equation 1. Columns (2),
(4) and (6) of this table show OLS regression results for equation 2. In the table, Age is rescaled and is
measured in decades. All specifications include industry-year-province dummies. Central = Local and
Central × CC = Local × CC are F statics for the tests H0: β1 = β2 and H0: β3 = β4, respectively. Clus-
tered (by firm) standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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the local government has more control rights, although for both owners the ef-
fect of government control increases with firm profitability. The Wald tests
suggest that the effects of central and local government control on ROA are
significantly different for all levels of firm performance. However, for ROE
the Wald tests indicate significant different effects only for firms with high
performance. For Tobin’s Q, we find that the positive effect of government
shareholdings is only present for local government-controlled higher-valued
firms, but not for lower-valued firms. The coefficients also suggest a U-shaped
pattern for the effect of firms controlled by the central government, with more
negative valuation effects for intermediate-valued firms compared to either
more or less valued firms.
IV.3. Robustness
To check the robustness of our findings, we re-estimated our model and added
the past value of performance to equation 2. Firm performance tends to be
Table 6
The effect of government control across the performance distribution
Quantiles 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Dependent variable: ROA
Government 0.014* 0.012** 0.005 0.006 0.013
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010)
CC 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.075*** 0.139***
(0.018) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.020)
Government × CC -0.052** -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.053*** -0.103***
(0.021) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.024)
Pseudo R2 0.341 0.172 0.165 0.206 0.285
Dependent variable: ROE
Government 0.039 0.031** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.043**
(0.034) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.022)
CC 0.120* 0.112*** 0.165*** 0.213*** 0.316***
(0.071) (0.026) (0.017) (0.026) (0.046)
Government × CC -0.149* -0.109*** -0.136*** -0.169*** -0.236***
(0.085) (0.031) (0.021) (0.031) (0.055)
Pseudo R2 0.304 0.144 0.124 0.146 0.222
Dependent variable: ln (TQ)
Government -0.032 -0.096*** -0.208*** -0.274*** -0.305***
(0.033) (0.028) (0.030) (0.043) (0.051)
CC -0.152** -0.160*** -0.239*** -0.281*** -0.217**
(0.069) (0.058) (0.064) (0.089) (0.108)
Government × CC 0.077 0.162** 0.332*** 0.406*** 0.398***
(0.082) (0.070) (0.076) (0.107) (0.129)
Pseudo R2 0.268 0.312 0.367 0.406 0.455
Observations 5,501 5,501 5,501 5,501 5,501
Notes: This table shows quantile regression results for equation 2. The percentiles are based on firm
performance. All specifications include firm-level controls and industry-province-year dummies. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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highly correlated with performance in previous years. A firm with a poor fi-
nancial performance in the previous year is more likely to be financially dis-
tressed in the current year than those with a financially healthy history. As
shown in Table 8, ROAt-1 and ln (TQ)t-1 are highly and significantly correlated
to current year performance. Nevertheless, we still find that government-
controlled firms have lower performance in these regressions, although the
Table 7
The effect of central and local government control across the performance distribution
Percentiles 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Dependent variable: ROA
Central 0.027** 0.019*** 0.013** 0.010 0.032**
(0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.013)
Local 0.007 0.009* 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
Central × CC -0.094*** -0.069*** -0.057*** -0.071*** -0.150***
(0.028) (0.016) (0.012) (0.018) (0.031)
Local × CC -0.025 -0.030** -0.028*** -0.042*** -0.080***
(0.023) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.025)
CC 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.055*** 0.073*** 0.136***
(0.017) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.019)
Pseudo R2 0.344 0.174 0.165 0.208 0.286
Central = Local 2.67 2.08 3.31* 0.87 4.50**
Central × CC = Local × CC 6.28** 6.05** 5.94** 2.77* 5.34**
Dependent variable: ROE
Central 0.034 0.034* 0.036*** 0.035* 0.101***
(0.049) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.030)
Local 0.029 0.026* 0.027*** 0.029** 0.035
(0.037) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.023)
Central × CC -0.162 -0.134*** -0.153*** -0.182*** -0.372***
(0.114) (0.042) (0.028) (0.042) (0.070)
Local × CC -0.109 -0.094*** -0.121*** -0.150*** -0.213***
(0.093) (0.034) (0.023) (0.034) (0.056)
CC 0.114 0.108*** 0.164*** 0.212*** 0.323***
(0.071) (0.026) (0.017) (0.026) (0.043)
Pseudo R2 0.305 0.145 0.125 0.146 0.224
Central = Local 0.01 0.19 0.61 0.10 4.59**
Central × CC = Local × CC 0.22 0.96 1.35 0.62 5.42**
Dependent variable: ln (TQ)
Central -0.011 -0.110*** -0.225*** -0.245*** -0.267***
(0.047) (0.039) (0.043) (0.061) (0.072)
Local -0.050 -0.095*** -0.188*** -0.284*** -0.321***
(0.036) (0.030) (0.033) (0.047) (0.055)
Central × CC 0.089 0.240*** 0.439*** 0.376*** 0.276
(0.110) (0.092) (0.101) (0.143) (0.168)
Local × CC 0.084 0.118 0.267*** 0.412*** 0.476***
(0.089) (0.074) (0.082) (0.116) (0.137)
CC -0.164** -0.155*** -0.224*** -0.281*** -0.247**
(0.069) (0.057) (0.063) (0.089) (0.105)
Pseudo R2 0.269 0.313 0.368 0.407 0.456
Central = Local 0.65 0.13 0.72 0.39 0.52
Central × CC = Local × CC 0.01 1.83 2.99* 0.07 1.47
Observations 5,501 5,501 5,501 5,501 5,501
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coefficients on government control and its interaction with CC are smaller
than those in Table 4. The interaction terms appear insignificant for Tobin’s
Q. So, in general the findings are fairly robust to including the past perfor-
mance measures.
Next, we examine whether our results are different for firms of different size.
For this purpose, Table 9 presents the estimation results corresponding to equa-
tion 1 for small firms (firms’ assets below the 50% percentile) and large firms
(firms’ assets above the 50% percentile). Columns (1), (3) and (5) shows results
for the small firms, while columns (2), (4) and (6) present the results for the large
firms. The results suggest that government control has a negative impact on the
performance of smaller and larger firms, although the effect seems to be more
significant in larger firms.
This table shows quantile regression results for equation 2. The
percentiles are based on firm performance. All specifications include firm-
level controls and industry-year-province dummies. Central = Local and
Central × CC = Local × CC are F statistics corresponding to H0: β1 = β2 and H0:
β3 = β4, respectively. The rejection of H0 is shown by stars. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Finally, Appendix B shows the results if we split our sample depending on
whether firms are located in special economic zones. The results do not suggest
that there is a systematic differential impact of government control on firm per-
formance across these subsamples.
Table 8
Dynamic Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROE ROE ln (TQ) ln (TQ)
ROAt  1 0.269*** 0.262***
(0.039) (0.040)
ROEt  1 0.034 0.023
(0.035) (0.035)
ln (TQ)t  1 0.601*** 0.594***
(0.025) (0.025)
Government -0.009*** 0.002 -0.019** 0.034* -0.020 -0.063**
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.014) (0.029)
Government × CC -0.034* -0.169*** 0.107
(0.018) (0.048) (0.070)
CC 0.058*** 0.207*** -0.041
(0.015) (0.038) (0.061)
Observations 4,531 4,438 4,531 4,438 4,530 4,437
R2 0.317 0.325 0.197 0.203 0.689 0.690
Notes: This table shows OLS regression results for equation 2, adding the lagged dependent variable.
All specifications include industry-province-year dummies. Clustered (by firm) standard errors are
shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The results reported in this study broaden our understanding of the role of gov-
ernment influence on firm performance. Our findings suggest a significant effect
of government control on corporate performance of Chinese listed companies.
Our empirical results indicate that government-controlled firms have a worse fi-
nancial performance than non-government-controlled firms. In addition, we find
that, in general, firms controlled by both central and local governments, have
such negative interventional effects on the performance of Chinese listed firms.
These conclusions support the ‘grabbing hand’ theory proposed by Shleifer
and Vishny (1994).
Additionally, our results based on quantile regressions show that the negative
interventional effect of government-control becomes stronger if firms get more
profitable. This implies that for distressed firms, government control is positively
associated with firm performance. This finding supports the ‘supporting hand’
theory of the government. In order to prevent non-profitable firms from being
delisted or going bankrupt, the government supports non-profitable firms. How-
ever, profitable firms are used by the government to achieve social and political
goals.
This study has a number of limitations. First, the way we define the govern-
ment control dummy ignores any possible influence of government in firms
which are defined as non-government controlled. Since, the concentration of
Table 9
Large firms vs. small firms
(Small) (Large) (Small) (Large) (Small) (Large)
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROE ROE ln (TQ) ln (TQ)
Government -0.018*** -0.007* -0.019 -0.024** -0.058 -0.062*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.039) (0.032)
Age -0.090*** -0.031** -0.203*** -0.063** 0.639*** 0.385***
(0.021) (0.013) (0.051) (0.029) (0.147) (0.091)
Age2 0.031*** 0.014** 0.082*** 0.030** -0.219*** -0.151***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.023) (0.013) (0.065) (0.042)
Size 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.034*** 0.032*** -0.296*** -0.078***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) (0.033) (0.015)
Leverage -0.099*** -0.186*** -0.214*** -0.253*** -0.061 -0.599***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.034) (0.037) (0.087) (0.114)
Constant -0.145 -0.041 -0.444** -0.440*** 6.711*** 2.371***
(0.091) (0.046) (0.178) (0.127) (0.703) (0.328)
Observations 2,761 2,740 2,761 2,740 2,761 2,740
R2 0.300 0.411 0.254 0.284 0.462 0.398
Notes: This table shows OLS regression results for equation 2. In the table, Age is rescaled and is mea-
sured in decades. Columns (1), (3) and (5) shows results for the smaller firms and columns (2), (4) and
(6) present the results for the larger firms. All specifications include industry-province-year dummies.
Clustered (by firm) standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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control is based on the biggest shareholder only, there may be non-government-
controlled firms in which the government is one of the larger (but not the biggest)
shareholders. Government might still influence such firms even if it is not the
largest shareholder. Future studies may come up with measures that take this in-
fluence into account. Second, the distribution of authorities in the pyramidal
ownership structure is complex. Although our measurement of the concentration
of control is an improvement, there exist other factors in the pyramidal structure
that could influence the actual implementation of control rights. Future research
could focus on differentiating the intricacy of these influential factors and con-
struct even better measures of government control.
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SUMMARY
The role of government involvement in firms has received a lot of attention in the last few decades. Govern-
ment involvement could result in a ‘supporting hand’ and a ‘grabbing hand’. This paper investigates how
government control influences the financial performance of Chinese listed firms. We use a panel data set
of firms publicly traded on the stock exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen over the period 2009-2013.
Our dataset includes 5501 firm-year observations. Our results suggest that government control of firms, mea-
sured by the shareholdings that are directly and indirectly controlled by the government, is negatively related
with firms’ financial performance. More specifically, the return on assets, the return on equity and the
market-to-book ratio are, on average, 1.3%, 2.0% and 8.2% lower for government-controlled firms. Both
central and local government control is undermining firm performance. These findings provide support for
the ‘grabbing hand’ theory of the government. Our results also suggest that the negative effect of govern-
ment control becomes stronger when firm profitability is higher. Firms with a poor financial performance
benefit from government control, which supports the ‘supporting hand’ theory of the government.
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